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Torrealba v. Kesmetis, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 10 (March 6, 2008)1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a district court summary judgment in a tort action.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Reversed and remanded the district court’s summary judgment dismissing claims 
of negligence per se and fraud, and remanding to the district court the question of 
whether instruments recorded but improperly acknowledged served as constructive notice 
under N.R.S. 111.320. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In 1997, Mrs. And Mrs. Leonard and Shelly Torrealbas began investing with 
J.M.K. Investments, Inc., such that J.M.K. would make real estate loans, naming the 
Torrealbas as lenders. In April 2000, J.M.K. informed the Torrealbas that borrowers on 
three loans were going to default. The defaulting loans included the Taylor ranch, Saxton, 
and Diamond Key Homes loans. On January 7, 2003, the Torrealbas learned that three 
declarations of agency and limited powers of attorney had been notarized and recorded 
for the loans. The powers of attorney authorized J.M.K. to sign for the Torrealbas when 
reconveying the deeds of trust to the borrowers.  
 The Torrealbas neither signed powers of attorney nor appeared before notaries for 
the Taylor ranch or Saxton loans. However, two notary employees of J.M.K., Laurie 
Kesmetis and Emily Herrera, notarized the Torrealbas’ signatures on powers of attorney 
and recorded the documents on February 20, 1998 for the Taylor ranch loan and May 27, 
1999 for the Saxton loan. Although Leonard Torrealba admitted to signing a document on 
his and Shelly Torrealba’s behalf, he asserted that he did not understand that the 
document was a power of attorney and did not sign the document in front of a notary. The 
document was recorded on July 20, 2000, but who notarized it remains unknown. 
On January 6, 2006, the Torrealbas filed a complaint in the district court against 
J.M.K, Kesmetis, Herrerra, and John Keilly, the president of J.M.K. The Torrealbas 
alleged negligence per se for violations of N.R.S. 240.075, 240.120, and 240.150. They 
also alleged fraud. They claimed injury as a result of J.M.K.’s improper reconveyance of 
deeds of trust in which the Torrealbas had an interest. The defendants argued that the 
statute of limitations barred the claim for negligence per se. The court agreed and granted 
the defendants summary judgment, further finding that the Torrealbas had constructive 
notice of all three powers of attorney upon recordation. The court also found that the 
Torrealbas had actual notice of the Diamond Key Homes power of attorney because 
Leonard had signed the document. As a result of both findings, the court determined that 
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the claims were time-barred under the two year statute of limitations pursuant to N.R.S. 
11.190(4)(b). The Torrealbas appealed after a denial of their motion for reconsideration.  
 
Discussion 
 
Negligence per se 
 
 The Torrealbas brought their actions under N.R.S. 240.150(1) and 240.150(2). 
They did not bring their claims under N.R.S. 240.150(3) and 240.150(4), which 
authorized the Secretary of State to discipline a notary public for willful violations of 
regulatory duties. Neither of the statutes under which the Torrealbas brought their claim 
referred to penalties. Therefore, the Torrealbas claimed that their negligence per se claim 
was not “[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty” and therefore should not be subject to 
the two-year statute of limitations which N.R.S. 11.190(4)(b) required. They argued that 
instead, N.R.S. 11.190(3)(a), which provides for a three-year statute of limitations for 
“actions upon a liability created by statute” should apply. 
 The court agreed, looking to Sonoma County v. Hall2 for its rationale. In Sonoma, 
the California court applied a three-year statute of limitations to an action on the bond of 
a county recorder.3 Statute had created the position of county recorder; statute prescribed 
the recorder’s duty to collect and pay fees; and statute created liability for failure to 
perform the duty.4 Thus when the recorder failed to pay the county the collected amount, 
the court applied the three-year statute for actions upon a statute-created liability.5
 Similarly here, a statute authorized the notary public’s position, duties and 
liabilities. The Secretary of State retained authority to penalize the notary. A notary was 
required to file a bond for $10,000 payable to the state to provide indemnification. The 
court reasoned that a claim on a notary’s official bond under 240.150(1) and 2401.150(2) 
was an action upon a liability created by statute. Therefore, the three-year statute of 
limitations applied.    
 The respondents further argued that the claims at bar were “[a]n action upon a 
statute for penalty” and therefore subject to the two-year statute of limitations. However, 
the court construed “penalty” as meaning something other than a pecuniary loss. Because 
the Torrealbas were suing for losses resulting from alleged notary misconduct, as 
authorized by statute, the court characterized their action as one upon a liability created 
by statute. The Torrealbas brought their claim within the three-year limit because they 
discovered the conduct on January 7, 2003 and filed their complaint on January 6, 2006. 
 
Fraud 
Upon appeal, the Torrealbas based a claim of fraud on N.R.S. 240.150. Because 
the statute makes no provision for fraud, the court concluded that such use of the statute 
was improper. The court said that the Torrealbas claim was based on common law. 
Therefore, the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to N.R.S. 11.190(3)(d) would 
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apply. The court held that the district court erred in applying the two year-statute of 
limitations pursuant to NRS 11.90(4)(b).  
  The district court found that the Torrealbas had actual notice of the Diamond Key 
Homes power of attorney when Leonard signed the document. The district court also 
found that Leonard had constructive notice of all three powers of attorney as of their 
recordation dates. These dates were all more than three years before the Torrealbas filed 
suit. However, the Torreablas claimed they discovered the facts regarding the fraud on 
January 7, 203. Noting that an action for fraud “accrues when the aggrieved party 
discovers the facts constituting the fraud,” the court held that their January 6, 2006 
complaint was timely. 
  
Actual notice 
 Although the Torrealbas acknowledged that Leonard signed their names on a 
document that later attached to the Diamond Key Homes power of attorney, they 
maintained that it was a separate sheet and did not include any acknowledgement. 
Furthermore, J.M.K. never informed the Torrealbas of the document’s intended use. The 
court ruled that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Leonard knew about 
the document and whether his signature supplied actual notice. The court therefore held 
that summary judgment against the Torrealbas was inappropriate. 
 
Constructive Notice 
 On this issue the court responded to an issue of first impression: whether the 
recordation of an improperly acknowledged instrument provided constructive notice. The 
Torrealbas maintained that it did not, while the respondents looked to N.R.S. 11.315 and 
N.R.S. 11.320 to contend that the act of recording certain instruments imparts notice of 
the documents to third parties, subsequent mortgagers, and subsequent purchasers. 
 The court held that a recorded but improperly acknowledged instrument could 
only provide constructive notice if honoring the instrument would not create harm or 
improperly benefit the notary or any other party to the instrument.  
 The court explained that N.R.S. 111.450(1) requires that powers of attorney be 
acknowledged and recorded in the same manner as any other instrument conveying or 
affecting property. Under N.R.S. 111.320, filing an acknowledged and recorded written 
instrument that conveys or affects property serves as notice of its contents to all persons. 
N.R.S. 111.315 requires that the instruments be recorded in the county in which the 
property exists if recordation is to serve as notice.  
 N.R.S 111.320 further requires that powers of attorney be acknowledged pursuant 
to N.R.S. Chapter 111. N.R.S. 111.240 requires that acknowledgement of a power of 
attorney containing authority to convey real property conform to provisions of the 
Uniform Law on Notarial Acts.6 
 The court concluded that a “bare allegation” of a defect in a power of attorney’s 
acknowledgement could not prevent a recorded power of attorney from serving 
constructive notice. The court also rejected a rule requiring strict compliance with 
notarial requirements because doing so would prevent courts from considering the 
individual facts of a case. In doing so it noted that some jurisdictions require strict 
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compliance.7 However, the court adopted the test from In re Williams,8 allowing courts 
to consider the individual facts in a case of defective acknowledgement. Doing so woul
allow courts to waive some technical notarial violations while protecting any actual harm 
that might flow from honoring an improperly acknowledged document.  
d 
                                                
 In Williams a notary altered an acknowledgement to appear as if the debtors in a 
bankruptcy case had signed a deed in Maryland.9 However, it had actually been notarized 
in West Virginia.10 The notary made the change because he was only authorized to 
acknowledge signatures in Maryland.11 The deed was then recorded in West Virginia.12 
The bankruptcy trustee sought to have the mortgage company declared an unsecured 
creditor because of the improper acknowledgement.13  
 The Williams court framed the test as whether any harm flowed from the 
transaction or any improper benefit flowed to the notary or any party to the instrument.14 
If the answer to either question was affirmative, then the acknowledgement was invalid 
and the recorded instrument would fail to serve constructive notice.15  
 Here, the court adopted the Williams test. The court provided a rationale similar to 
that of Williams and stated that the test “strikes an appropriate balance between 
respecting the role of substantive notary requirements in protecting parties to a 
transaction from wrongdoing or fraud and recognizing that certain technical 
acknowledgement violations may not warrant voiding an instrument.”   
 The district court concluded that for at least three years before they filed their 
complaint, the Torrealbas had constructive notice of all three powers of attorney. 
However because it was not clear whether the Diamond Key Homes loan power of 
attorney had been signed, acknowledged or recorded, the issue was remanded to the 
district court. 
 The Torrealbas had constructive notice of the other two loans only if improper 
benefit to the notaries or other parties would not flow or harm would result as a result of 
honoring the improperly acknowledged power of attorney. The Torrealbas alleged that 
they never appeared before the notaries to sign the powers of attorney for the Saxton or 
Taylor Ranch loans. No genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to the propriety 
of the acknowledgements because J.M.K. did not refute that the Torrealbas failed to 
appear before the notaries. Since they did not appear, the powers of attorney were not 
acknowledged pursuant to N.R.S. 240.1655(2)(a), and the court therefore reversed 
summary judgment. It further remanded to the district court for a determination of 
whether honoring the improperly acknowledged powers of attorney would cause harm or 
confer a benefit. 
 
 
7 See Szczepka v. Weaver, 942 P.2d 247, 249 (Okla. Civ. App. 1997); Succession of Wilson, 213 So. 2d 
776, 780 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Gulft  Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 61 S.W.2d 185, 186-187 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1993). 
8 584 S.E.2d 922 (W. Va. 2003). 
9 Id. at 924. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 928. 
15 Id. 
Conclusion 
 
The court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on the Torrealbas’ claim of 
negligence per se because the claim was brought under N.R.S. 240.150(1)-(2), which is 
subject to the three-year statute of limitations provided by N.R.S. 11.190(3)(a). The court 
also reversed summary judgment on the fraud claim because common-law fraud is 
subject to a three-year statue of limitations under N.R.S. 11.190(3)(d). The court 
remanded to the district court to determine whether the Torrealbas filed their complaint 
within the three-year limitation period. 
 The court reversed summary judgment on the issue of whether the Torrealbas had 
actual notice of the Diamond Key Homes power of attorney. The court did so because a 
genuine factual dispute remained as to whether Leonard’s signature charged the 
Torrealbas with actual notice.  
 The court also adopted the test from Williams to determine whether a recorded but 
improperly acknowledged instrument could impart constructive notice. It held that if the 
notary or any party to the instrument would obtain improper benefit as a result of the 
court’s honoring improper acknowledgement, the acknowledgement should be void for 
constructive purposes. The court reversed and remanded to the district court to apply the 
test.  
